C ryptography is a subject that straddles many divides: its academic roots span disciplines including mathematics, computer science, and electronic engineering. In addition, with the advent of the digital age, cryptography is used in the real world now more than ever. Most citizens use cryptography every day, whether they're using a mobile phone network, chip-and-pin payment/ATM technology, or simply browsing the web. us, cryptography is no longer the preserve of government and academics but has a direct impact on people's lives. e diversity of tradition and application, and the contemporary relevance of the subject, makes working in cryptography a fascinating and enriching experience.
However, this diversity of foundations and current approaches to the subject also carries a signi cant risk.
e trend is for scientists to become ever more specialized, irrespective of the subject. Yet cryptography's power is that it links theory with practice, mathematics with computer science, electronic engineering with deep theory. Over the years, this has led to many in the community wondering how to ensure that the community stays together and how to bridge the gap between what's done in research institutions and what's deployed in products.
Bringing the Community Together
e year 2012 marked one century since the birth of Alan Turing, and as part of the celebrations, a workshop was held in Cambridge, UK, to address the problem of bridging the gap between theory and practice in cryptography. e workshop's provocative title was "Is Cryptography eory Practically Relevant?" With roughly 100 participants, this rst meeting was vibrant and sparked a lot of interest so much so that within a week, the organizers (guest editors Kenny Paterson and Nigel P. Smart) were contacted by companies and academics wanting to organize a follow-up workshop for the next year. Paterson and Smart formed a small commi ee, including our coeditor Dan Boneh, that came up with the be er title of "Real World Cryptography," and the annual RWC workshop series was born. Workshops under this name were held in Stanford in 2013, New York in 2014, and London in 2015. In 2016, we visited Stanford for a second time, and the 2017 event will be held in New York once more. Keeping the pattern of cycling between the US West and East Coasts and Europe, we're delighted to announce that the 2018 event will take place in Zurich.
e workshop, always held in early January, now a racts signi cant corporate sponsorship and has become one of the largest annual conferences devoted to cryptography, with around 500 participants each year. It breaks the mold of traditional conferences in computer science: there are currently no proceedings, and half the speakers are determined by the organizing commi ee, with the other half self-nominating. e nal selection of speakers is made on the basis of presentation ability, relevance to the audience, and impact quite di erent from the usual selection criteria of technical wizardry that's used in scienti c conferences.
Building a Community of Real-World Cryptographers

REAL-WORLD CRYPTO
RWC is now a place where companies present open problems for the community to work on, where academics present new ideas that could be made into products, and where the security of protocols that matter is analyzed. It's quickly become the go-to place for anyone working on practical cryptography in both academia and industry.
In This Issue
In view of RWC's rapid growth and success, we were approached by the editors of IEEE Security & Privacy magazine in 2015 to produce a special issue devoted to real-world cryptography. The goal of this special issue is to celebrate the great work being done on the interface between practice and theory. The articles show that real-world cryptography isn't just focused on the traditional aspects of communications security but now ranges far and wide. They also demonstrate that practitioners are concerned about the societal impacts and the social constructs underlying our "science. "
Levchin Prize for Real-World Cryptography
In 2016, the RWC workshop was further enhanced by the donation of $20,000 per annum in perpetuity by Max Levchin (founder of PayPal, Slide, and Yelp) to fund an annual award in the area of real-world cryptography, which goes to two individuals (or groups) each year. The first winners were Phillip Rogaway (for his groundbreaking work on practice-oriented research, authenticated encryption, and formatpreserving encryption) and the core miTLS team of Cédric Fournet, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, and Markulf Kohlweiss (for their work on the first verified implementation of the TLS protocol and their discovery of numerous protocol flaws and implementation weaknesses in TLS).
The first two articles in this special issue are by these first recipients of the Levchin prize. We're delighted to have their contributions. In the first article, "PracticeOriented Provable Security and the Social Construction of Cryptography," Rogaway takes a personal view of the current dominant methodology in the design of cryptographic schemes-namely provable security. He argues that the decisions made in such an approach, both in terms of technicalities and ascetics, aren't inevitable and are socially constructed.
In the second article, "miTLS: Verifying Protocol Implementations against Real-World Attacks," Bhargavan , Fournet, and Kohlweiss, from the team behind the miTLS project, examine the security of the protocol used to secure the Internet-namely TLS. They examine recent attacks and the development of the new standard TLS 1.3 and review their achievement of obtaining a fully verified implementation of most of the TLS protocol, including the lessons learned while performing the implementation.
Verification, Standardization, and Obfuscating Traffic
The theme of verification is also covered in Aaron Tomb's article, "Automated Verification of Real-World Cryptographic Implementations." Unlike the miTLS work, which verified an implementation of a protocol stack, Tomb's work concerns the verification and validation of implementations of basic cryptographic building blocks. In particular, it considers building blocks such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-384, and keyed-hash message authentication code. Just as the miTLS team needed to utilize nonstandard languages to perform their validation, Tomb uses Cryptol, an open source tool developed by Galois that has found increasing use in the design and validation of high-assurance cryptographic implementations.
Our next article, "A Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma," by Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes, examines the history of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) standardization and the recent announcements of the NSA to deprecate the Suite B ECC recommendations and of NIST to launch a postquantum standard competition. The linking of these two announcements might imply various plausible alternative motivations, which Koblitz and Menezes discuss in their article.
The article by Lucas Dixon, Thomas Ristenpart, and Thomas Shrimpton, "Network Traffic Obfuscation and Automated Internet Censorship," recounts some recent work on cryptographic methods for obfuscating network traffic. The authors explain how to use cryptography to circumvent the increasing amount of Internet censorship by repressive regimes around the world. The authors show how packets can be obfuscated to avoid capture by censors who are using deep-packet inspection techniques.
Our final article, "Memory Encryption for GeneralPurpose Processors" by Shay Gueron, explores the inner workings of the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE), which is a central component of Intel's recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX) architecture. SGX is designed to run a secure workload in an isolated environment inside the x86 processor. Everything outside the processor, including main memory, is untrusted. Consequently, every page stored in main memory must be encrypted on write and decrypted on read, at processor speed. Moreover, the MEE must defend against tampering and replay attacks on the main memory, again at processor speed. Gueron describes the cryptographic mechanisms used in the MEE and how it detects tampering and replay. W e hope you enjoy this special issue of IEEE S&P magazine. We also hope that it will contribute to the increasing interplay between cryptographic theory and practice.
See A s genomics becomes increasingly integrated into healthcare and direct-to-consumer recreational services (such as ancestry testing), DNA data leakage is a serious risk for both individuals and their relatives. Failure to adequately protect such information could lead to societal and regulatory backlashes, impeding large-scale genomic research projects. is concern prompts the need for research and innovation in all genome privacy and security aspects, including, but not limited to privacypreserving analysis of and computation on genomic data, security and privacy metrics for genomic data leakage, crosslayer a acks to genome privacy, access control for genomic data, and di erentiated access rights for medical professionals.
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